Political Passion in the Trump Era: Where to Rebuild After the Destruction?

By: blockbeats|2025/03/19 13:15:03
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Original Article Title: This thing will fail
Original Article Author: Noah Smith
Translated Article: Block unicorn

Political Passion in the Trump Era: Where to Rebuild After the Destruction?

“Men don’t care what’s on TV. They only care what else is on TV.” —Jerry Seinfeld

N.S. Leons is a popular essayist in the "national conservative" tradition. His Substack, "The Upheaval," is recommended reading, although I disagree with less than half of what he writes. But he is well-read, broad-minded, able to integrate information from multiple fields, and unafraid to think deeply about historical questions in real time. Reading his work will help you understand the beliefs of the modern right. On many issues, his information is urgently needed by people in the MAGA world.

In a recent article titled "America's Mighty God," Leons pointed out what I think is a profound truth of our current historical moment. He wrote, "The long 20th century is over, a period defined by liberalism (social, political, and economic), anchored in the rejection of Adolf Hitler:

I believe what we are seeing today is indeed the end of an era, a epochal upheaval of the world we know, the full meaning and impact of which has not yet truly touched us.

More specifically, I believe Donald Trump marks the belated end of the "long 20th century"...

Our "long 20th century" got off to a late start, not fully solidified until 1945, but in the following 80 years, its spirit dominated our civilization's entire understanding of the world order and its rightful face...After the terror of the Second World War, the leadership of America and Europe naturally made 'never let history repeat itself' the core of its ideological system. They were determined, together, never to let fascism, war, and genocide again threaten humanity...

The anti-fascism of the 20th century evolved into a great crusade...By making 'never let history repeat itself' the ultimate priority, the ideology of the open society placed the 'greatest evil' (summum malum) at the core, rather than the 'highest good' (summum bonum). This unique figure of Hitler not only lurked in the depths of 20th-century thought; he also dominated people's subconscious, becoming a secular Satan...As René Girard mockingly called it, this 'Adolf Hitler's second profession' provided a quasi-religious justification for the open society consensus and the entire post-war liberal order: to prevent the resurrection of the immortal leader...

The “Long Twentieth Century” was characterized by three interrelated post-war projects: the gradual opening of society through the deconstruction of norms and boundaries, the consolidation of the managerial state, and the hegemony of a free international order. It was hoped that these three projects could together lay the foundation for ultimately achieving world peace and harmonious coexistence of all humanity.

Like all great articles, this article is somewhat hyperbolic. The post-war American-led liberalism was not a purely defensive project. The motivations behind the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were not fueled by a fear of Hitler’s return but by a desire to extend the boundaries of human freedom and dignity to unprecedented levels. Ronald Reagan did not need Hitler as a bogeyman to promote his vision of American freedom but rather saw it as a universal ideal.

However, in some important sense, Lyons is correct. The shocking terror and spectacular failure of the Hitler regime provided a moral anchor for liberals, allowing them to always invoke a larger liberalism based on this. Advocates of the Civil Rights Act in the United States and other liberalizing laws often used Nazi Germany as a rhetorical foil. Anti-communism briefly provided another Satan for the right, but its influence was never quite the same, as the U.S. had been Stalin’s ally in World War II; anti-communism was soon forgotten after the Soviet Union's collapse, but Hitler and the Nazis were not.

Lyons is right in saying that the Trump era marked the end of Hitler as the Western cultural “evil”—at least in the U.S. The two most popular media personalities on the American right, Joe Rogan and Tucker Carlson, invited Daryl Cooper—a historical revisionist who downplays Nazi atrocities and considers Winston Churchill the real villain of World War II—to speak on their shows. Here is a (now-deleted) tweet from Cooper for reference:

This tweet, I believe, showcases the mindset of the American right. It is wrong to say that the Trump movement or modern national conservatism represents full-throated support for Nazism. However, it is undisputed that the American right believes that “awokeness” poses a greater threat than the potential return of Hitler.

Why has the legend of Hitler lost its terror? There are several reasons. The generation that defeated the Nazis has largely passed away, meaning that for most Americans, Hitler is just a character in movies and books; like Tamerlane or Genghis Khan, over time, the fear of a mass murderer has gradually faded. The Palestinian movement effectively removed Jews from the list of minority groups protected by the left, those whose rights might be defended through riots. Social media has led to an overuse of the “Nazi” label, giving rise to the popular saying “everyone I don’t like is Hitler.”

Leontes's attitude toward this transformation is far more optimistic than mine. Personally, I think demonizing Hitler is a good idea. As a general moral principle, "don't be Hitler" does indeed seem quite reliable. Even if you only care about the strength of Western civilization, someone who, out of ideological motivations, initiated military actions, led to the end of the European global empire, massacred over 20 million Slavic people, ended Germany's great power status, and solidified Soviet control over half of Europe, seems like a case to be avoided.

But Leontes believes that the end of anti-Nazi-ism as a guiding Western principle will pave the way for the return of morality, community, roots, faith, and civilizational pride—things conservatives like:

Highly influential liberal thinkers such as Karl Popper and Theodor Adorno helped convince the post-war ideologically compliant establishment that the fundamental source of authoritarianism and conflict in the world is the "closed society." This society was marked by characteristics that Reno calls the "god of the strong": strong beliefs and truth claims, strong moral codes, strong interpersonal bonds, strong community identities and connections to place and the past—ultimately, all these "objects of human affection and loyalty… are the source of a community's passions and loyalties."

Now, the unifying power of the god of the strong is seen as dangerous, a hellish source of fanaticism, oppression, hatred, and violence. Bonds of faith, family, and especially meaningful national identity are now seen as suspicious and worrisome regressive temptations leading back to fascism…

The open society consensus and its flimsy divinities have not produced a utopian world of peace and progress but rather led to the disintegration and despair of civilization. As expected, the god of the strong in history was exiled, religious traditions and moral norms were laid bare, community bonds and loyalties weakened, distinctions and boundaries dismantled, autonomous disciplines handed over to top-down technocratic management. It is hardly surprising that this has resulted in a lack of cohesion in nation-states and wider civilizations, let alone the ability to resist external threats from closed, delusional societies. In short, the radical self-denial movement pursued by the post-war open society consensus has effectively become a collective suicide pact for Western liberal democratic nations.

I'm not entirely sure if Leontes's interpretation of history is correct. After all, as Robert Putnam documented in his book "Bowling Alone," the post-war decades in America witnessed the largest surge in church attendance, civic engagement, family formation, and social cohesion since the early days of the Republic. Here are the data on church attendance, which skyrocketed after World War II and remained high especially among those over 40 in the 2010s:

Here is Putnam's index of social capital, combining measures of civic and religious engagement along with family formation:

The New Deal and the post-war period even witnessed a substantial growth in the use of the word "we" over "I" in American books:

The "god-like figure" has never been as potent as in the American generation that grew up listening to Roosevelt preach liberalism on the radio and continued to grind Adolf Hitler into the dust. From the unified struggle of World War II to the subsequent great American unity, a causal line is not difficult to draw.

The greatest generation wholeheartedly believed that Hitler was Satan on Earth. But they did not see the need to crush family, community, and tradition to preserve an open society. In fact, their society was both open and deeply rooted. My grandparents knew the name and life story of every neighbor until the day they died; how many "national conservative" intellectuals and die-hard Trump fans can say the same?

Nevertheless, the American "god-like figure" did eventually fade. Lions believes that Trump is bringing them back:

Mary Harrington recently observed that the Trumpian revolution seems both political and archetypal, noting that the widespread "excited response" among men to Elon Musk and his "young tech-bro cadre" recent work reflects a phenomenon that can be "understood from an archetypal perspective as their engaging in combat with a vast, fog-like enemy with the objective of destroying male heroism itself" when breaking down the entrenched bureaucratic system. This masculine-tinted spirit of "thymotic vitality" was suppressed throughout the "long 20th century," but now it is back...

Today's populism is... a long-suppressed desire for thymotic aspiration, a desire to take the actions that should have been taken long ago, to break free from the suffocating lethargy brought about by proceduralism, and to fight passionately for collective survival and self-interest. This is politics returning to politics. It demands a restoration of ancient virtues, including a vital sense of the nation and civilization's self-worth...

This is what Trump, with all his ruggedness, represents: the powerful deity has escaped exile and returned to America... Trump himself is a man of action, not of contemplation... he... is the embodiment of the entire rebellious new world spirit that is overturning the old order... The boldness of Trump's actions reflects not only partisan political gamesmanship—it represents the overturning of the old paradigm; now "you can just get things done."

Here, the term "thumotic" refers to Harvey Mansfield's use of the Greek word "thumos" to denote a political passion and drive. Francis Fukuyama spells it as "thymos" and as early as 1992 predicted that Donald Trump could be the perfect embodiment of the "thumotic" impulse of Americans to dismantle the liberal establishment.

Therefore, Leonhardt sees Trumpism as a reassertion of a wild, unapologetically male-driven force in the style of "Fight Club" — just different from Tyler Durden in that while he directed it towards anarchy, Leonhardt sees Trump and Musk indulging in their masculine fervor in dismantling the bureaucratic system.

Yet Leonhardt never specifically explains how this destructive impulse would bring about the return of the "strongman" he desires. He views the bureaucratic system and other post-war American institutions as obstacles to revival — foundations of family, community, and faith — but he never truly moves beyond the shattering of these so-called barriers to envision actual rebuilding. He simply assumes it will happen naturally or considers it a future problem.

I believe he will be disappointed. Trump's movement has existed for a decade now, and during this time, it has built nothing at all. There are no Trump Youth. No Trump community centers, Trump neighborhood associations, or Trump business clubs. Trump supporters have not flocked to traditional religion either; while Christianity's decline halted since the pandemic, feelings of Christian identity and church attendance remain well below levels seen at the turn of the century. Republicans still have more children than Democrats, but red-state birth rates are also declining.

In Trump's first term, right-wing efforts to organize civic engagement were almost laughably sparse. A few hundred "proud boys" gathered, brawling with antifascists on the streets of Berkeley and Portland. There were some smaller right-wing anti-lockdown protests in 2020. About two thousand people participated in the January 6th riot — mostly middle-aged. None of these formed the kind of enduring grassroots organizations common in the 1950s.

For a few, Trump's first term was a live-action role-playing game; for others, it was just a YouTube channel.

And what about Trump's second term to date? Nothing at all. Even rally attendance has sharply declined. National conservatives who might have gone out in 2017 to meet up are now curled up alone in their living rooms, flipping between X, OnlyFans, and DraftKings, throwing punches in the air when they read about Elon Musk and his tech-nerd squad firing employees or Trump cutting aid to Ukraine. "You can just get things done," yet hardly any of Trump's supporters are actually doing anything, except passively cheering for their team in name only. Unless you are one of the few geeks helping Musk dismantle the bureaucracy, this "vision" is entirely secondhand.

You see, the MAGA movement is an online phenomenon. It is another vertical online community — a group of disconnected, atomized individuals weakly connected over vast distances through the illusory bonds of ideology and identity. It has no sense of family, community, or rootedness to a place. It is a digital commodity. It is a subforum. It is a fan club.

N.S. Léonce and the National Conservatives completely misunderstand the reasons why America abandoned its roots, community, family, and faith. We didn't abandon these "strong gods" because the liberals were too harsh on old Adolf (Hitler). We abandoned them because of technology.

In the 1920s, America saw a surge in widespread prosperity along with the emergence of technology that granted individuals unprecedented autonomy and control over their physical location and access to information. The ownership of cars allowed Americans to travel anywhere, anytime, freeing them from their ties to specific locations. Telephone ownership enabled people to communicate over long distances. Television and radio exposed them to new ideas and cultures, while the internet exposed them to even more.

Then came social media and smartphones. Suddenly, "society" no longer meant the people in your physical surroundings—your neighbors, coworkers, workout partners, and so on. First, "society" turned into a group of avatars typing messages to you on a small glass screen in your pocket. Your phone became the place where you met and conversed with friends and loved ones, as well as where you argued about politics and ideas. People's roots shifted from physical space to digital space.

Increasing evidence indicates that smartphone-enabled social media is linked to isolation and alienation, loneliness, declining religious belief, decreased family formation, and reduced birth rates. The technologies of the 20th century—cars, phones, TV, and the internet—made American society somewhat disjointed, but they managed to partially resist and retain remnants of the roots. However, social media enabled by smartphones broke through these final resistance barriers, turning us into free particles floating in the intangible space of memes, identities, and distractions.

Indeed, the mighty gods are more fragile than the new gods made of silicon.

The people who have achieved this feat are more or less the ones N.S. Léonce is now cheering for. Of course, not Elon Musk himself; he only makes cars and rockets. But Steve Jobs, Jack Dorsey, Zhang Yiming, and a large group of entrepreneurs who follow their "grand visions" to pursue immense wealth have built the virtual world that has become our most real home.

I'm not saying what they did is evil. Technology has a way of progressing in an advanced society; if it can be done, it's likely it will be done. No one could have foreseen its downsides. But the ironic part is that N.S. Léonce now believes that the group of people who will usher in a new era of roots and community is the same group that destroyed the old era.

Regardless, yes, this thing will fail because nothing was built up. Yes, every ideological movement assures us that after the old order is completely overturned, a utopia will take its place. Somehow, the utopia never seems to arrive. Instead, the so-called temporary period of pain and sacrifice gets longer and longer, and the ideologues in charge become increasingly enthusiastic about blaming enemies and purging revolutionary foes. At some point, people will see clearly that the promise of utopia was just an excuse to eliminate enemies—the "grand vision" itself has become the purpose.

The former U.S. Treasury Secretary has already told us that the economic pain caused by Trump is just a "detox period." Trump has blamed the stock market drop on "globalists," and Trump's Department of Justice has attributed egg prices to hoarders and speculators. If you can't recognize this storyline, then you must not follow the news or history very closely.

Mere destruction of the old order itself will not create anything. The Visigoths and Vandals built nothing on the ruins of Rome. They indulged in their "greatness," plundered wealth for a while, and then vanished into myth and memory.

Over the past fifteen years, I have watched in dismay as the real-world communities and families I knew in my youth have been torn apart, replaced by a bunch of fictional online identity movements. I am still waiting for someone to figure out how to put society back together — how to do what Roosevelt and the Greatest Generation did a century ago. Watching the MAGA movement, I am pretty sure this is not the answer.

Original Article Link

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值得注意的是,Virtuals 的 Genesis 機制與近期 Binance 推出的 Alpha 積分系統有一些相似之處,評估用戶在 Alpha 和幣安錢包生態系統內的參與度,決定用戶 Alpha 代幣空投的資格。用戶可透過持倉、交易等方式獲得積分,積分越高,參與新項目的機會越大。透過積分系統篩選使用者、分配資源,專案方能夠更有效地激勵社群參與,提升專案的公平性和透明度。 Virtuals 和 Binance 的探索,或許預示著加密融資的新趨勢正在形成。


回看這次對話,empty 在專訪中所展現出的思路與判斷,正在一步步顯現其前瞻性,這不僅是一場圍繞打新機制的訪談,更是一次關於“資產驅動型 AI 協議”的路徑構建與底層邏輯的深度討論。


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BlockBeats:可以簡單分享一下最近團隊主要在忙些什麼?
empty:目前我們的工作重點主要有兩個部分。第一部分,我們希望將 Virtuals 打造成一個類似「華爾街」的代理人(Agent)服務平台。設想一下,如果你是專注於 Agent 或 Agent 團隊建立的創業者,從融資、發幣到流動性退出,整個流程都需要係統性的支援。我們希望為真正專注於 Agent 和 AI 研發的團隊,提供這一整套服務體系,讓他們可以把精力集中在底層能力的開發上,而不用為其他環節分心。這一塊的工作其實也包括了與散戶買賣相關的內容,後面可以再詳細展開。


第二部分,我們正在深入推進 AI 相關的佈局。我們的願景是建立一個 AI 社會,希望每個 Agent 都能聚焦自身優勢,同時透過彼此之間的協作,實現更大的價值。因此,最近我們發布了一個新的標準——ACP(Agent Communication Protocol),目的是讓不同的 Agent 能夠相互互動、協作,共同推動各自的業務目標。這是目前我們主要在推進的兩大方向。



BlockBeats:可以再展開說說嗎?

empty:在我看來,其實我們面對的客戶群可以分為三類:第一類是專注於開發 Agent 的團隊;第二類是投資者,包括散戶、基金等各種投資機構;第三類則是 C 端用戶,也就是最終使用 Agent 產品的個人用戶。


不過,我們主要的精力其實是放在前兩大類──也就是團隊和投資人。對於 C 端用戶這一塊,我們並不打算直接介入,而是希望各個 Agent 團隊能夠自己解決 C 端市場的拓展問題。


此外,我們也認為,Agent 與 Agent 之間的交互作用應該成為一個核心模式。簡單來說,就是未來的服務更多應該是由一個 Agent 銷售或提供給另一個 Agent,而不是單純賣給人類使用者。因此,在團隊的 BD 工作中,我們也積極幫助現有的 AI 團隊尋找這樣的客戶和合作機會。


BlockBeats:大概有一些什麼具體案例呢?


empty:「華爾街」說白了就是圍繞資本運作體系的建設,假設你是一個技術團隊,想要融資,傳統路徑是去找 VC 募資,拿到資金後開始發展。如果專案做得不錯,接下來可能會考慮進入二級市場,例如在紐約證券交易所上市,或是在 Binance 這樣的交易所上幣,實現流動性退出。


我們希望把這一整套流程打通-從早期融資,到專案開發過程中對資金的靈活使用需求,再到最終二級市場的流動性退出,全部覆蓋和完善,這是我們希望補齊的一條完整鏈條。


而這一部分的工作和 ACP(Agent Communication Protocol)是不同的,ACP 更多是關於 Agent 與 Agent 之間交互標準的製定,不直接涉及資本運作系統。


BlockBeats:它和現在 Virtuals 的這個 Launchpad 有什麼差別呢?資金也是從 C 端來是嗎?


empty:其實現在你在 Virtuals 上發幣,如果沒有真正融到資金,那就只是發了一個幣而已,實際是融不到錢的。我們目前能提供的服務,是透過設定買賣時的交易稅機制,從中提取一部分稅收回饋給創業者,希望這部分能成為他們的現金流來源。


不過,問題其實還分成兩塊。第一是如何真正幫助團隊完成融資,這個問題目前我們還沒有徹底解決。第二是關於目前專案發行模式本身存在的結構性問題。簡單來說,現在的版本有點像過去 Pumpfun 那種模式——也就是當專案剛上線時,部分籌碼就被外賣給了外部投資人。但現實是,目前整個市場上存在著太多機構集團和「狙擊手」。


當一個真正優秀的專案一發幣,還沒真正觸達普通散戶,就已經被機構在極高估值時搶購了。等到散戶能夠接觸到時,往往價格已經偏高,專案品質也可能變差,整個價值發行體係被扭曲。


針對這個問題,我們希望探索一種新的發幣和融資模式,目的是讓專案方的籌碼既不是死死握在自己手裡,也不是優先流向英文圈的大機構,而是能夠真正留給那些相信專案、願意長期支持專案的普通投資者手中。我們正在思考該如何設計這樣一個新的發行機制,來解決這個根本問題。


BlockBeats:新模式的具體想法會是什麼樣子呢?


empty:關於資金這一塊,其實我們目前還沒有完全想透。現階段來看,最直接的方式還是去找 VC 融資,或是採取公開預售等形式進行資金募集。不過說實話,我個人對傳統的公開預售模式並不是特別認同。


在「公平發售」這件事上,我們正在嘗試換一個角度來思考-希望能從「reputation」出發,重新設計機制。


具體來說,就是如果你對整個 Virtuals 生態有貢獻,例如早期參與、提供支持或建設,那麼你就可以在後續購買優質代幣時享有更高的優先權。透過這種方式,我們希望把資源更多留給真正支持生態發展的用戶,而不是由短期套利的人主導。


如何從交易稅中「自養」團隊


BlockBeats:您會不會考慮採用類似之前 Fjord Foundry 推出的 LBP 模式,或者像 Daos.fun 那種採用白名單機制的模式。這些模式在某種程度上,和您剛才提到的「對生態有貢獻的人享有優先權」的想法是有些相似的。不過,這類做法後來也引發了一些爭議,例如白名單內部操作、分配不公等問題。 Virtuals 在設計時會考慮借鏡這些模式的優點,或有針對性地規避類似的問題嗎?


empty:我認為白名單機制最大的問題在於,白名單的選擇權掌握在專案方手中。這和「老鼠倉」行為非常相似。專案方可以選擇將白名單名額分配給自己人或身邊的朋友,導致最終的籌碼仍然掌握在少數人手中。


我們希望做的,依然是類似白名單的機制,但不同的是,白名單的獲取權應基於一個公開透明的規則體系,而不是由項目方單方面決定。只有這樣,才能真正做到公平分配,避免內幕操作的問題。


我認為在今天這個 AI 時代,很多時候創業並不需要大量資金。我常跟團隊強調,你們應該優先考慮自力更生,例如透過組成社區,而不是一開始就想著去融資。因為一旦融資,實際上就等於背負了負債。


我們更希望從 Training Fee的角度去看待早期發展路徑。也就是說,專案可以選擇直接發幣,透過交易稅所帶來的現金流,支持日常營運。這樣一來,專案可以在公開建設的過程中獲得初步資金,而不是依賴外部投資。如果專案做大了,自然也會有機會透過二級市場流動性退出。


當然最理想的情況是,專案本身能夠有穩定的現金流來源,這樣甚至連自己的幣都無需拋售,這才是真正健康可持續的狀態。


我自己也常在和團隊交流時分享這種思路,很有意思的是,那些真正抱著「搞快錢」心態的項目,一聽到這種機制就失去了興趣。他們會覺得,在這種模式下,既無法操作老鼠倉,也很難短期套利,於是很快就選擇離開。


但從我們的角度來看,這其實反而是個很好的篩選機制。透過這種方式,理念不同的專案自然會被過濾出去,最後留下的,都是那些願意真正建立、和我們價值觀契合的團隊,一起把事情做起來。


BlockBeats:這個理念可以發展出一些能夠創造收益的 AI agent。


empty:我覺得這是很有必要的。坦白說,放眼今天的市場,真正擁有穩定現金流的產品幾乎鳳毛麟角,但我認為這並不意味著我們應該停止嘗試。事實上,我們每天在對接的團隊中,有至少一半以上的人依然懷抱著長遠的願景。很多時候,他們甚至已經提前向我們提供了 VC 階段的資金支持,或表達了強烈的合作意願。


其實對他們來說想要去收穫一個很好的社區,因為社區可以給他們的產品做更好的回饋,這才是他們真正的目的。這樣聽起來有一點匪夷所思,但其實真的有很多這樣的團隊,而那種團隊的是我們真的想扶持的團隊。


AI Agent 該賣給誰?


BlockBeats:您剛才提到的這套「AI 華爾街」的產品體系-從融資、發行到退出,建構的是一整套完整的流程。這套機制是否更多是為了激勵那些有意願發幣的團隊?還是說,它在設計上也考慮瞭如何更好地支持那些希望透過產品本身的現金流來發展的團隊?這兩類團隊在您這套體系中會不會被區別對待,或者說有什麼機制設計能讓不同路徑的創業者都能被合理支持?


empty:是的,我們 BD 的核心職責其實就是去鼓勵團隊發幣。說得直接一點,就是引導他們思考發幣的可能性和意義。所以團隊最常問的問題就是:「為什麼要發幣?」這時我們需要採取不同的方式和角度,去幫助他們理解背後的價值邏輯。當然如果最終判斷不適合,我們也不會強迫他們推進。


不過我們觀察到一個非常明顯的趨勢,傳統的融資路徑已經越來越難走通了。過去那種融資做大,發幣上所的模式已經逐漸失效。面對這樣的現實,很多團隊都陷入了尷尬的境地。而我們希望能從鏈上和加密的視角,提供一套不同的解決方案,讓他們找到新的發展路徑。


BlockBeats:明白,我剛才其實想表達的是,您剛剛也提到,傳統的 AI 模式在很大程度上仍然依賴「燒錢」競爭。但在 DeepSeek 出現之後,市場上一些資金體積較小的團隊或投資人開始重新燃起了信心,躍躍欲試地進入這個領域。您怎麼看待這種現象?這會不會對目前正在做 AI 基礎研發,或是 AI 應用層開發的團隊產生一定的影響?


empty:對,我覺得先不談 DeepSeek,從傳統角度來看,其實到目前為止,AI 領域真正賺錢的只有英偉達,其他幾乎所有玩家都還沒有實現盈利。所以其實沒有人真正享受了這個商業模式的成果,大家也仍在探索如何面對 C 端打造真正有產出的應用。


沒有哪個領域像幣圈一樣能如此快速獲得社群回饋。你一發幣,用戶就會主動去讀白皮書的每一個字,試試你產品的每個功能。


當然,這套機制並不適合所有人。例如有些 Agent 產品偏 Web2,對於幣圈用戶而言,可能感知不到其價值。因此,我也會鼓勵做 Agent 的團隊在 Virtuals 生態中認真思考,如何真正將 Crypto 作為自身產品的差異化要素加以運用與設計。


BlockBeats:這點我特別認同,在 Crypto 這個領域 AI 的迭代速度確實非常快,但這群用戶給予的回饋,真的是代表真實的市場需求嗎?或者說這些回饋是否真的符合更大眾化、更具規模性的需求?


empty:我覺得很多時候產品本身不應該是強行推廣給不適合的使用者群體。例如 AIXBT 最成功的一點就在於,它的用戶本身就是那群炒作他人內容的人,所以他們的使用行為是非常自然的,並不覺得是在被迫使用一個無聊的產品。 mass adoption 這個概念已經講了很多年,大家可能早就該放棄這個執念了。我們不如就認了,把東西賣給幣圈的人就好了。


BlockBeats:AI Agent 與 AI Agent 所對應的代幣之間,究竟應該是什麼樣的動態關係?


empty:對,我覺得這裡可以分成兩個核心點。首先其實不是在投資某個具體的 AI Agent,而是在投資背後經營這個 Agent 的團隊。你應該把它理解為一種更接近創投的思路:你投的是這個人,而不是他目前正在做的產品。因為產品本身是可以快速變化的,可能一個月後團隊會發現方向不對,立即調整。所以,這裡的「幣」本質上代表的是對團隊的信任,而不是某個特定 Agent 本身。


第二則是期望一旦某個 Agent 產品做出來後,未來它能真正產生現金流,或者有實際的使用場景(utility),從而讓對應的代幣具備賦能效應。


BlockBeats:您覺得有哪些賦能方式是目前還沒看到的,但未來可能出現、值得期待的?


empty:其實主要有兩塊,第一是比較常見的那種你要使用我的產品,就必須付費,或者使用代幣支付,從而間接實現對代幣的「軟銷毀」或消耗。


但我覺得更有趣的賦能方式,其實是在獲客成本的角度思考。也就是說,你希望你的用戶同時也是你的投資者,這樣他們就有動機去主動幫你推廣、吸引更多用戶。


開源≠賦能,開發者≠社群


BlockBeats:那基於這些觀點,您怎麼看 ai16z,在專案設計和代幣機制方面,似乎整體表現並不太樂觀?


empty:從一個很純粹的投資角度來看,撇開我們與他們之間的關係,其實很簡單。他們現在做的事情,對代幣本身沒有任何賦能。從開源的角度來看,一個開源模型本身是無法直接賦能代幣的。


但它仍然有價值的原因在於,它像一個期權(call option),也就是說,如果有一天他們突然決定要做一些事情,比如推出一個 launchpad,那麼那些提前知道、提前參與的人,可能會因此受益。


開發者未來確實有可能會使用他們的 Launchpad,只有在那一刻,代幣才會真正產生賦能。這是目前最大的一個問號——如果這個模式真的跑得通,我認為確實會非常強大,因為他們的確觸達了大量開發者。


但我個人還是有很多疑問。例如即使我是使用 Eliza 的開發者,也不代表我一定會選擇在他們的 Launchpad 上發幣。我會貨比三家,會比較。而且,做一個 Launchpad 和做一個開源框架,所需的產品能力和社群運作能力是完全不同的,這是另一個重要的不確定性。


BlockBeats:這種不同是體現在什麼地方呢?


empty:在 Virtuals 上我們幾乎每天都在處理客服相關的問題,只要有任何一個團隊在我們平台上發生 rug,即使與我們沒有直接關係,用戶也會第一時間來找我們投訴。


這時我們就必須出面安撫用戶,並思考如何降低 rug 的整體風險。一旦有團隊因為自己的代幣設計錯誤或技術失誤而被駭客攻擊、資產被盜,我們往往需要自掏腰包,確保他們的社群至少能拿回一點資金,以便專案能夠重新開始。這些項目方可能在技術上很強,但未必擅長代幣發行,結果因操作失誤被攻擊導致資產損失。只要涉及「被欺騙」相關的問題,對我們來說就已經是非常麻煩的事了,做這些工作跟做交易所的客服沒有太大差別。


另一方面,做 BD 也非常困難。優秀的團隊手上有很多選擇,他們可以選擇在 Pumpfun 或交易所上發幣,為什麼他們要來找我們,那這背後必須要有一整套支援體系,包括融資支援、技術協助、市場推廣等,每個環節都不能出問題。


BlockBeats:那我們就繼續沿著這個話題聊聊 Virtuals 目前的 Launchpad 業務。有一些社群成員在 Twitter 上統計了 Virtuals Launchpad 的整體獲利狀況,確實目前看起來獲利的項目比較少。接下來 Launchpad 還會是 Virtuals 的主要業務區嗎?還是說,未來的重心會逐漸轉向您剛才提到的「AI 華爾街」這條路徑?


empty:其實這兩塊本質上是一件事,是一整套體系的一部分,所以我們必須繼續推進。市場的波動是很正常的,我們始終要堅持的一點是:非常清楚地認識到我們的核心客戶是誰。我一直強調我們的客戶只有兩類——團隊。所以市場行情的好壞對我們來說並不是最重要的,關鍵是在每一個關鍵節點上,對於一個團隊來說,發幣的最佳選擇是否依然是我們 Virtuals。


BlockBeats:您會不會擔心「Crypto + AI」或「Crypto AI Agent」這一類敘事已經過去了?如果未來還有一輪多頭市場,您是否認為市場炒作的焦點可能已經不再是這些方向了?


empty:有可能啊,我覺得 it is what it is,這確實是有可能發生的,但這也屬於我們無法控制的範圍。不過如果你問我,在所有可能的趨勢中,哪個賽道更有機會長期保持領先,我仍然認為是 AI。從一個打德撲的角度來看,它仍然是最優選擇。


而且我們團隊的技術架構和底層能力其實早已搭建完成了,現在只是順勢而為而已。更重要的是,我們本身真的熱愛這件事,帶著好奇心去做這件事。每天早上醒來就有驅動力去研究最新的技術,這種狀態本身就挺讓人滿足的,對吧?


很多時候,大家不應該只看產品本身。實際上很多優秀的團隊,他們的基因決定了他們有在規則中勝出的能力——他們可能過去在做派盤交易時,每筆規模就是上百萬的操作,而這些團隊的 CEO,一年的薪資可能就有 100 萬美金。如果他們願意出來單幹項目,從天使投資或 VC 的視角來看,這本質上是用一個很划算的價格買到一個高品質的團隊。


更何況這些資產是 liquid 的,不是鎖倉狀態。如果你當下不急著用錢,完全可以在早期階段買進一些優秀團隊的代幣,靜靜等待他們去創造一些奇蹟,基本上就是這樣一個邏輯。

第16週鏈上數據:結構性供需失衡加劇,數據揭⽰下⼀輪上漲的堅實藍圖?

短期預期市場有很⼤可能在目前價位震盪後繼續軋空,目前⾯臨回檔的⻛險較低。

川普次子的加密生意經

艾瑞克·川普:他們朝我丟Crypto,我拿Crypto砌「小」樓。

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